1. Introduction¹

In 2015, the total number of people seeking asylum in the European Union, consisting of 28 countries, amounted to around 1,3 million in total (Eurostat, 2018). Around the same time, at the end of 2014, around 1.2 million refugees from Syria alone were registered in Lebanon (UNHCR, 2018a). In fact, Lebanon, since its establishment, has been considered a ‘land of refuge’, and has historically been providing shelter to Armenians, Palestinians, Iraqis, and Syrians, as well as to a great number of unregistered refugees from other countries.² Today, although formal statistics adhere to a total of approximately 1.1 to 1.8 million refugees (ECHO, 2018; LCRP, 2018:8), the total figure of refugees residing in the country informally is estimated to be around 2, or even 2.5 million.³ This discrepancy can be mainly explained due to a long history of unrestricted – and mainly informal and unregistered – migration between Syria and Lebanon (Chalcraft 2009:9).

Thus, it may not come as a surprise that Lebanon, a country of approximately 4.5 million inhabitants before the Syrian crisis erupted (UNDESA, 2017), has the highest per capita concentration of refugees worldwide (ECHO, 2018), hosting around 10% of the world’s total refugee population,⁴ residing on a small territory of 10,452 km² – a size comparable to a quarter of countries such as the Netherlands, Switzerland, or Denmark. The waves of refugees arrived in a fragile and politically unstable context already shaken by recurring war, invasions, political violence, as well as foreign interventions, leading inter alia to shrinking resources and increasing public debts (see section 3 of this report).

Large influxes and protracted presence of (forced) migrants have only added extra layers to the multitude of challenges Lebanon is facing. Fear of altering demographic and sectarian balances following the arrival of refugees, and of terrorism ‘spilling over’ to Lebanon have contributed to a variety of ever-changing discourses on the refugee crisis. Uncorroborated by facts, these discourses have implicated the refugee issue as being highly politicized (Janmyr, 2016:60), and enhanced the ‘securitization’ of migration into the country. This has resulted in increasingly restrictive policies regulating the entry to and residency of different populations in Lebanon, oftentimes prioritising security over access to basic human rights. As a result, a large proportion of the migration population remains deprived of their rights and opportunities to lawfully access asylum and protection, furthering their precariousness and vulnerability.

This report aims to provide a contextual understanding of migration governance in the Lebanese context, as well as its implications for refugees and migrants. Towards this end, this report provides a – non-exhaustive – overview of the legal framework on asylum in Lebanon, notably within the context of the Syrian refugee crisis erupting in 2011. Moreover, it critically evaluates the legal statuses – if any – pertaining to ‘asylum seekers’, ‘refugees’, and ‘migrants’ on the one hand, and the role of state and non-state actors on the other.As the following sections will illustrate, differentiating between different legal categories - be it refugees, guests, asylum seekers, migrants - appears rather complex, and renders the governance of migration by a variety of (formal, but also informal) actors more difficult.

2. A long tradition of migration, mobility, and circulation

The geographical area of what is modern-day Lebanon has experienced several waves of migration inflow, outflow, and circulation (Tabar, 2010). As such, Lebanon, the Arab country with the longest history of migration, is traditionally characterized by highly fluctuating migration rates (MPC, 2013).

Under Ottoman rule (sixteenth to twentieth century), a number of emigration waves from Lebanon can be distinguished, mainly driven by economic prosperity, political motives, and the eruption of national and international conflicts (Tabar, 2010). In the late nineteenth century, Christian-Muslim communal conflicts (MPC, 2013), long periods of drought and famine (AUB, n.d.),⁵ the economic crisis triggered by the collapse of the silk industry, the emergence of a middle class, increased urbanisation, and the fear of military conscription into the Ottoman imperial army drove many – particularly Christian – individuals to resettle. Emigration rates were high to the extent that by the end of World War I (1914-1919), a third of the population in Lebanon had emigrated (Tabar, 2010).⁶ Following World War II, another wave of Lebanese emigration started in 1945, and would last until 1975.⁷

Emigration waves until then were characterized by the low-skilled profiles of emigrants (Bel-Air, 2017). The outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) – including sectarian violence, Israeli and US led military invasions, social conflicts, militia strifes, Palestinian factions’ participation to the civil conflict, Syrian military occupation, various massacres – as well as harsh economic consequences - not only led to large-scale internal displacement ranging from 50,000 to 600,000 individuals (Global IDP, 2004), but also spurred another wave of emigration, leading an estimate 990,000 people – all with greatly varying socio-economic profiles (MPC, 2013) – to leave Lebanese territories (Tabar 2010).⁸

In the post-war period after the 1990s, Lebanon has been witnessing an increase in skilled emigration, defined as individuals with over 10 years of education – often referred to as ‘the brain drain’ (Bendek et al., 2011). In 2015, 32% of emigration rates were comprised of a high proportion of individuals with high-skilled profiles; twice the rate of other categories of emigration (Ajluni and Kawar, 2015).⁹

Nowadays, the size of the Lebanese diaspora is estimated between four and 14 million, spanning all continents (Jaulin, 2006; The National Archives, 2007).¹⁰ As a consequence, remittances are one of the major sources of income for the country: they make up for over 14% of Lebanon’s GDP, with a total of 7.31 billion USD dollars at the end of 2016 (Credit Libanais Economic Research Unit, 2017).¹¹

Historically, Lebanon has not only been characterised by its emigration waves, but also its immigration waves. Unique for its religious diversity with 18 recognized sects and rather liberal political and social realms, the area of present-day Lebanon has always been home to persecuted groups: its mountains mythically were a land of refuge to the persecuted Maronite christians since the fifth century. This immigration character did not change after the establishment of the state. Fleeing the massacres following the ‘homogenization plan’ of the Turkish nationalist party Union Committee and Progress to ‘cleanse’ Turkey’s non-muslim populations (Sfeir, 2017), Armenian refugees arrived to Lebanon in three waves, in 1918, 1922, and 1939, respectively (Bel-Air, 2017). Between World War I and World War II, Kurds from Turkey and Christian Syrians and Assyrians from Iraq settled in Lebanon (Lebanon Support, 2015:11). During the ‘50s, economic migrants, as well as political refugees, both from Syria and Egypt, settled in Lebanon (Lebanon Support, 2015:11). Palestinians arrived in Lebanon following the Nakba, in 1948, 1967, and the 1990s, heralded notably by Arab-Israeli conflicts, the two-state partition and the Six Day war (1967). During the 80’s, the Saddam Hussein regime, as well as United States’ interventions starting in 2003, spurred the influx of Iraqi refugees into Lebanon. More recently, despite a long and undocumented¹² history of Syrian circular labour migration (Chalcraft, 2009), following the eruption of the Syrian crisis in 2011, Lebanon has experienced a sharp increase in Syrian refugees’ presence, as well. The next section provides an overview of Lebanon’s demographics over the period 2011 - 2017.

3. Lebanon: a socio-political overview

Lebanon is a consociational democracy (Lijphart 1969; Picard, 2002), combining ‘republican, representative, parliamentary, democratic liberal and confessional characteristics’ (Majzoub 2002: 250-256 cited in Hamd, n.d), instilled by the 1943 National Pact, and reapportioned by the Tai’f Agreement at the end of the Civil War that shook the country between 1975 and 1990. Until today, political representation in Lebanon is divided along a power-sharing structure, that ensures ‘equal’ representation among the countries’ biggest sects, based on the 1932 census.

Distribution of powers

Article 17 of the Lebanese Constitution entrusts the executive power to the (confessionally-mixed) Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, in turn, is appointed by the President, in consultation with the Parliament. The president is appointed by the Parliament. By custom, the President must be Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister Sunni, and the speaker of Parliament Shi’ite.

Article 16 of the Lebanese Constitution stipulates the Parliament as the legislative power. In total, the Lebanese Parliament consists of 128 seats. Both the Council of Ministers and Chamber of Deputies have the right to propose laws (Article 18). The constitutionality of laws is supervised by a Constitutional Council.

Lastly, Article 20 states that the judicial power ‘shall be exercised by courts or various degrees and jurisdictions’, and should consist of independent judges and litigants. In practice, the judicial structure consists of regular, religious and exceptional/special courts.

In addition, the Lebanese constitution, as stipulated by the Tai’f Agreement that formally ended the Civil War (1975-1990), includes the principle of ‘extensive administrative decentralisation’ in order to stimulate local development and encourage citizen participation. As such, Lebanon, a unitary state, consists of a higher deconcentrated tier, consisting of eight governorates, and a lower deconcentrated tier of 25 districts. The decentralised tier consists of 1108 municipalities – a relatively high number compared to other countries - and 56 municipal federations (Democracy Reporting International, 2017). Although ‘by law, [they are] granted a significant level of autonomy and a wide array of functions, municipalities are in reality hindered by conflicting legislative texts, the absence of a viable accountability mechanism, administrative and fiscal bottlenecks, and heavy central government control’ (Democracy Reporting International, 2017).

The massive influx of Syrian refugees since 2011 – at times even doubling town population sizes (Oxfam, 2015) have led local authorities – without proper capacities – to assume increased responsibility, notably for the implementation of security measures (Oxfam, 2013:15).

Socio-economic, political, and cultural context

Lebanon’s ‘merchant republic’ (Gates, 1998) and economic system have historically been based on liberalism and ‘laisser faire’ aiming at reaching immediate economic growth, rather than seeking long-term development goals. In the same logic, after the end of the Civil War (1990), reconstruction efforts focused on rebuilding infrastructure, and promoting economic growth, rather than prioritising social and economic reforms (AbiYaghi & Catusse, 2011). The 

foundation for political and economic reforms spanned from implementing a schedular system of taxation, mainly levied on corporates, profits, payroll, and movable capital (IDAL, 2016), to a full-fledged free market system complying with the neoliberal doxa (Dibeh, 2005), whereas the development of the social (or welfare) system has never moved beyond ‘embryonic’ stages (Nasr, 2017). For example, over 52% of employees in Lebanon are not enrolled in any social security scheme (Nasnas, 2007).

The context of the post-war period is characterised by a predominant idea of an ‘absent’ or ‘weak’ state in which Lebanon is facing multi-layered social, social, and political challenges. Twenty five years after the end of the Civil War, Lebanon, a country with an already fragile governance system and substandard infrastructure, did not succeeded to provide its population with ‘efficient public and affordable public services’ (Apprioual, 2016:1). Until the present day, Lebanese cities and regions experience daily power cuts, water shortages, a faulty healthcare system, and an absence of public transportation (ibid).

In addition, the Lebanese labour market is characterized by high levels of informality, with around 50% of the population in Lebanon working in informal settings (Ajluni & Kawar, 2015). Although the Syrian crisis compounded this situation, unemployment rates had already been rising prior to 2011. Unemployment rates oscillate from 6% to 25%¹³, reaching up to 34% among Lebanese youth (Lebanon Support, 2016b). With the third highest worldwide public debt of 156,1% of GDP (IMF, 2018), projected to increase to 180% in 2023 (Reuters, 2018, and an account deficit of around 20% (World Bank, n.d.)¹⁴, Lebanon is seeking billions of dollars to stimulate the economy (El Koury & Agence France Presse, 2018).¹⁵

Today, Lebanon has been experiencing a waste management crisis, access to water and electricity has been rationed, and the infrastructure needs ongoing development. In 2016, it ranked 76th out of 188 countries in the Human Development Index (2016).

4. The power of data: scarcity of figures safeguarding a delicate sectarian balance

As mentioned above, the last official census in Lebanon was conducted in 1932 is still considered as a reference until today. Although the Central Administration of Statistics (CAS) is a public administration within the Council of Ministers, set up to ‘produce relevant and accurate statistics that are comparable over time’, the most recent demographic surveys were conducted in 2009, 2007, and 2004. Due to its political implications, statistical data on religious-sectarian      affiliations      is      not      collected      by      the      CAS. Moreover, grounds for entry, residency, and exit are generally not available (for example, asylum based on religious grounds, political grounds, family reunification, economic purposes; students; tourists), and information on the number of rejected (or de-registered) persons is unavailable. Finally, data on asylum is lacking and numbers on migration are inconclusive despite their availability – as will be demonstrated in this section.

Therefore, the most recent statistical information on Lebanon mainly relies on indicators and analyses provided by semi-independent agencies and organizations at the local, national or international levels, such as the UN and EU humanitarian, relief and development agencies. However, it is worth noting that data collected by UN relief agencies and organizations concerned with vulnerable populations, such as refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers, can slightly vary in reports and factsheets by the same agency or across different organizations within the same timeframe. This can be attributed to differences in reporting times between beginning, middle or end of year statistical reading or different methodologies and approaches used. In addition, although some UN statistics and databases are in open-access, they are often archived imprecise and/or inconsistently, making them hard to locate.

Consequently, Lebanon’s demographic changes remain an ‘enigma’ (Verdeil, E. and Dewailly, 2016 cited De Bel-Air, 2017) and numbers are, at best, ‘educated guesses’ (De Bel-Air, 2017), as they are generally not available, outdated, incomplete, or even contradictory. As a result, the numbers used throughout the report, herein, remain mere indications. More importantly, they do not take into account illegality and informality.

TABLE  1: Estimates of the Lebanese population from 2011-2017:

Lebanon currently hosts approximately 1.1 to 1.8 million registered refugees, notably from Syria, Palestine, Palestinian refugees from Syria, and Iraq (UNHCR, 2018a; ECHO, 2018; LCRP, 2018:8). The following table presents the estimates for the biggest refugee communities in Lebanon; from Syria, Iraq, and Palestine. It should be noted, however, that although UNHCR and UNRWA estimates are used as the main sources for numbers on Lebanon’s refugee population, little information is available on whether or not these databases are frequently updated,¹⁷ especially taking into consideration that registration with these agencies occurs on a voluntary basis,¹⁸ and that UN agencies can be requested to suspend registration for refugees – or even de-register them- by the Lebanese authorities. This was the case for UNHCR, that – upon governmental request – has been requested to ‘temporarily’ stop registering Syrian refugees (or, ‘displaced’ persons) as of May 2015: a decision that is still in place at the time of writing this report.¹⁹

TABLE  2: Estimates of refugees by origin in Lebanon from 2011 - 2017:

Additionally, according to the records of the Ministry of Labour in 2017, Lebanon has 252,317 officially registered migrant workers (See Table 3). Around 80% of this number are migrant domestic workers (The General Security, 2016:16). Combined together, refugees and migrant workers make up for approximately 25% - 30% of Lebanon’s population (Al Jazeera 2017; ECHO, 2018).

TABLE  3: Registered migrant workers in Lebanon from 2011-2017 by the Ministry of Labour (2018):²³

5. Asylum in Lebanon: between rights and praxis

The legal framework on refugee protection in Lebanon is composed of various provisions stipulated in the Lebanese constitution, international treaties, immigration legislation, and policies and decrees, that provide for access to asylum, as well as basic temporary protection for refugees, and prohibit refoulement.

The 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees

Despite its active role in the establishment of international refugee legislation and drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Lebanon, like many countries in the Middle East hosting large numbers of Palestinian refugees, has not ratified of the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the ‘Geneva Convention’), and its 1967 Protocol,²⁵ which defines the term ‘refugees’, outlines their rights and freedoms, and specifies legal and protection obligations of host states.²⁶

In the context of the Syrian crisis, the Lebanese government has adopted a dissociation policy in the context of the Syrian crisis, using a variety of terms (‘displaced persons’, ‘guests’) to refer to those who, under international law, would be classified as refugees.²⁷

The Lebanese Constitution

Still, although Lebanon is a non-party to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 protocol, it is constitutionally committed to provide basic temporary protection to individuals with well-founded fears of persecution. First of all, the preamble of the Lebanese constitution describes Lebanon as ‘a founding and active member of the United Nations Organization’ that abides by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, emphasising that ‘the Government shall embody these principles in all fields and areas without exception’. Thus, this includes Article 14:1 of the Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that ‘Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution’. Second, constitutional court decisions (for example, decision no. 2 of 1999; decision no. 4 of 2001; see Appendix II) provide that the preamble of the Lebanese constitution, as well as the human rights conventions it refers to – namely the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) – form a ‘constitutional block’, which has acquired the legal force of 

a constitutional norm (Frontiers-Ruwad & EMHRN, 2015).²⁸ At the same time, ‘tawtīn‘ – a concept allowing for multiple interpretations, which roughly can be translated as permanent settlement of foreigners – is explicitly prohibited in the preamble of the constitution (as amended in 1990).

International treaties and NON-REFOULEMENT

In addition, Lebanon is bound by international treaties to which it is a party to provide basic temporary protection to asylum seekers and refugees, notably without imposed time limits or discriminations based on nationality or ethnicity (for an overview of international human rights instruments, see Appendix I). Moreover, by means of customary international law, as well as by peremptory norms under international law (ALEF, 2013), and by virtue of having ratified the United Nations Convention Against Torture and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Frontiers Center, 2013) Lebanon is committed to, amongst others, the principle of non-refoulement²⁹ (UNHCR, 1977).

Bilateral agreements

Other international agreements, notably between Syria and Lebanon, rationalising an open border policy between the two countries after the end of the Lebanese Civil War, include three bilateral treaties facilitating (i) the free movement of goods and people,³⁰ (ii) the freedom to reside, work, and practice economic activity,³¹ and (iii) the right for nationals from both countries to enjoy the other state’s treatment, rights, and obligations in compliance with prevailing national laws and regulations (CLDH, 2013; Syrian Lebanese Higher Council, 1991c). Until today, these bilateral agreements, together with the 1992 Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination governing foreign policy between Lebanon and Syria and the 1993 Agreement for Economic and Social Cooperation and Coordination, that was developed to regulate Lebanese-Syrian relations during the period of Syrian occupation, govern Syrian nationals’ presence, as well as their access to the labour market in Lebanon, facilitating a long history of migration and circulation, characterised by an ‘uncharacteristically free’ labour market between Syria and Lebanon (Chalcraft, 2009; CLDH, 2013).³²

Domestic legislation

Despite aforementioned provisions stipulated in constitutional principles and international agreements, at the national level, a formal and comprehensive refugee legislation framework remains embryonic in Lebanon. Asylum seekers are subjected to immigration laws monitoring the entry, residency, and departure of foreigners, which include some provisions pertaining to the concept of asylum. Foreign presence in Lebanon is mainly governed by provisions of the 1962 Law Regulating the Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Lebanon and their Exit from the Country (Lebanon Migration Law, 1962).

Chapter VIII includes six articles related to - political - asylum. First of all, Article 26 stipulates that 'any foreign national who is the subject of a prosecution or a conviction by an authority that is not Lebanese for a political crime or whose life or freedom is threatened, also for political reasons, may request political asylum in Lebanon.³³ It is noteworthy that provisions in Article 27 stipulate some basic asylum procedures, including refugee registration procedures (Article 28),³⁴ the right to reject asylum (Article 29),³⁵ and requirements to refrain from all political activity after asylum has been granted (Article 30). Ironically, while article 27 provides for a Committee, consisting of the Minister of Interior, and The Director-Generals of the Ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs, and General Directorate of General Security, it explicitly denounces the right to appeal asylum adjudication, even in the case of abuse of power.³⁶ Importantly, Article 31 provides for the non-refoulement of former political refugees: ‘In the event that a former political refugee is deported, he or she may not be removed to the territory of a country where his or her life or freedom is threatened’.

However, none of these articles include details on the application procedure (length, steps, interviews, questionnaires, fingerprints, photos, health checks), different actors and their respective responsibilities, or procedures and timeframes following rejection of the asylum application. As such, these asylum procedures are to be further developed, not in the least because the provisions only apply to those who seek refuge on political grounds, although in reality, individuals seeking refuge do so for a variety of motives that may change overtime (Koser and Martin 2011). What is more, is this asylum mechanism appears non-functioning: asylum has only been recorded once since its establishment (Kyodo, 2003).³⁷ Consequently, in the absence of a comprehensive domestic legal framework that is able to absorb refugees and asylum seekers, they are often considered irregular migrants.

Irregular migration

Whereas asylum procedures are left relatively implicit in the current legal framework, irregular migration is explicit denounced. Chapter IX of the Law of Entry and Exit contains provisions on penalization of illegal entry or presence. Article 32 dictates a penalty (one to three months imprisonment and/or a fine), upon entry that is not in compliance with provisions stated in the Law. For non-Lebanese, these provisions include holding valid documentation, a visa, and legal entry through one of the posts of General Directorate of General Security. Lastly, Article 17 requires that ‘a foreign national shall be deported from Lebanon if the presence of that foreign national is considered to be a threat to public security.³⁸

As such, foreigners – as per the 1962 Law of Entry and Exit, as well as per the Lebanese Constitution, the Lebanese Penal Code, and the Criminal Procedural Code (Sahin-Mencutek, forthcoming) – are liable to arrest, penalties, and deportation by the General Directorate of General Security (GSO). UNHCR’s attempt to exempt refugees and asylum seekers from criminalization of illegal entry in 2010, did not materialize (Frontiers-Ruwad & EMHRN, 2015). As will be argued in following sections, arrest and (arbitrary) detention based on illegal entry or residency are systematically used in Lebanon (Frontiers-Ruwad & EMHRN, 2015).

Lastly, under Lebanese law, human trafficking is prohibited. Anti-trafficking law no. 164 (2011) prescribes penalties varying from five to fifteen years of imprisonment for sex trafficking and forced labour (Shaheen, 2016).³⁹ Lebanon has entered the readmission agreements, bilateral agreements, and international agreements that regulate the readmission of illegal migrants, and prescribe cooperation to prevent and control irregular migration (CARIM, 2009a; 2009b; 2009c; 2009d; 2009e; 2009f; Council of the European Union, 2002; United Nations, 2000a; 2000b; 2001).

Still, although the right to asylum and basic temporary protection is entrenched in the Lebanese Constitution, and provided under international conventions signed and ratified by Lebanon, Lebanon has refused to abide by them, which can be traced back to the prolonged Palestinian displacement (Stevens, 2014), that clearly determined how refugees in Lebanon are treated nowadays. Although these international instruments constitutionally take precedence over the national legal framework governing access to asylum, in reality, this principle is rarely adhered to (ALEF 2013; Janmyr 2017; Stevens, 2016), despite court rulings, as will be argued in the next sections in this report.

Since the onset of the Syrian crisis in 2011, the already fragile domestic legal framework for refugees and asylum seekers has been placed under significant strain, and was unable to absorb the mass influx of refugees. As such, it has failed to provide a pathway to guarantee access territories, to rights and to protection of refugees and asylum seekers.

6. The legal status of asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants in Lebanon

In the absence of comprehensive national refugee law, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) – signed in September 2003 by UNHCR and Lebanon’s security agency General Directorate of General Security (GSO) – was the first step towards formal recognition and regulation of refugee presence, for the first time explicitly acknowledging the right to asylum on Lebanese territories for individuals with well-founded fear of returning to their home countries. Still, as argued in this section, many refugees are unable to regularise their status through this instrument. Contrastingly, migrant workers generally have legal papers, although in a precarious way, with high risks of losing their legal status at any moment.

The UNHCR 'refugee status’

The 2003 MoU clearly defines respective obligations of UNHCR and the Lebanese authorities regarding the rights of asylum seekers, Refugee Status Determination and finding durable solutions (UNHCR, 2004). The MoU was developed in the light of the Iraqi refugee crisis, following increased numbers of detention and deportation by GSO rendering the Gentlemen’s agreement between UNHCR and the Lebanese authorities since 1963 ineffective. Although it was regarded as an unprecedented step, its implications highly impacted the legal status of refugees and asylum seekers.

First of all, the MoU reiterates Lebanon’s position as a transit country, and peculiarly defines the term asylum seeker: 'Whereas Lebanon is not an asylum country [...] the term ʻasylum seekerʼ shall mean, for the purpose of this Memorandum, ʻa person seeking asylum in a country other than Lebanonʼ. Article 1 narrows this definition down to those who register at UNHCR after 2003 within two months of illegally entering Lebanese territories, and who apply to UNHCR for refugee status within two months of their arrival in the country (Trad & Frangieh, 2007), thus excluding those who entered on legal grounds, before 2003, or those not registered or rejected by UNHCR.⁴⁰

Second, Article 8 of the MoU assigns UNHCR in specific cases with the conduction of refugee status determination (Article 8, MoU). As such, it provided for the issuing of temporary residence – or circulation – permits by GSO for asylum seekers, normally valid up to 3 months, allowing UNHCR to adjudicate individual asylum claims (Article 4 and 5, MoU). Upon recognition, the circulation permit can be extended for 6 to 9 months by the GSO (Article 9, MoU). Still, the MoU has been met with vast criticism: although UNHCR is administered with refugee status determinations, such determinations are not per definition formally recognised by the Lebanese authorities (and thus do not per se result in legal status of refugees). Moreover, the MoU does not explicitly recognize the principle of non-refoulement. Although non-refoulement is respected for a period of one year, during which refugees are to be resettled, refugees again face the risk of deportation in case resettlement attempts fail (Frontiers-Ruwad & EMHRN, 2015).

Furthermore, during this limited period, UNHCR bound itself to find a durable solution for refugees. The MoU emphasized that ‘the only viable durable solution for refugees recognized under the mandate of UNHCR is the resettlement in a third country’. Given that UNHCR lacks 

authority or the capacity to guarantee acceptance in resettlement states (Frangieh, 2016; Janmyr 2018:395), and lengthy bureaucratic processes for resettlement can take up to years, this has significantly hampered UNHCR’s resettlement efforts. Indeed, refugee registration, refugee status determination and resettlement rarely occured within the twelve-month period (Human Rights Watch, 2007). A legal expert explains:

UNHCR doesn't have a mandate to find a durable solution: it has a mandate to advocate for durable solution but not to provide them. Durable solutions are state solutions, for example local integration, resettlement, voluntary return. [This MoU] puts the advocator of durable solutions in charge and responsible to find the durable solutions, which is impossible. We call this obligation de moyens⁴¹ : an obligation to put all the effort into finding that solution. It’s not an obligation of result, because they cannot guarantee the result.⁴²

Importantly, the MoU – unlike MoUs signed, for example, in Jordan – was not designed for mass influx of refugees (Frangieh, 2016; Frontiers-Ruwad & EMHRN, 2015). Five months before signing the MoU, UNHCR declared a temporary protection regime (TPR)⁴³ for Iraqi refugees residing in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Under the TPR, which anticipated large-scale Iraqi displacement, refugees should be admitted to safety, human rights ought to be respected, non-refoulement should be respected, and safe repatriation can be considered – conditions permitting (Frontiers-Ruwad, 2007). Moreover, it provided that Iraqi nationals should not be individually interviewed for refugee status determination, with the exception of extremely vulnerable individuals (UNHCR, 2007). As a result, by the end of 2006, a mere 561 Iraqi nationals were recognized as refugees under the MoU, whereas 2,356 individuals only received UNHCR asylum seeker certificates under the TPR (Danish Refugee Council, 2005). Yet, the TPR was implemented by UNHCR without any formal agreement by the Lebanese state (Frontiers-Ruwad, 2007); UNHCR asylum seeker certificates were not acknowledged by the Lebanese authorities, subjecting refugees under the TPR to be considered as illegal migrants, liable to arrest and detention. In addition, the lack of formal recognition as refugees, combined with the fact that under the TPR, claims for refugee status were not assessed, contributed to a ‘state of limbo’ for Iraqi refugees (Trad and Frangieh, 2007:11). In reality, for those recognised under the MoU – as opposed to those with the TPR status – little significance was given to their UNHCR’s refugee status determination by Lebanese authorities either (Kagan, 2012) and residency permits were not issued in a systematic or timely manner (Frontiers۷ Ruwad & EMHRN, 2015). These examples demonstrate a divergence between UNHCR refugee status determination and formal refugee status acknowledgement by the Lebanese authorities.

In addition, the number of Iraqi refugees saw a significant rise, almost doubling between 2006 and 2007.⁴⁴ In this vein, UNHCR granted a prima facie status⁴⁵ to all Iraqi nationals from central and southern Iraq as of January 2007. However, similar to UNHCR’s TPR status determination, the prima facie status was virtually not acknowledged by Lebanese authorities, either.

If in 2007, the influx of 2600 Iraqi refugees into Lebanon was considered unprecedented, the mass influx of Syrian refugees as of 2011 reached new peaks. With 1,1 million – a significantly higher number than the number of Iraqi refugees – the MoU in its current state was unable to regulate mass influx of refugees who, moreover, entered lawfully following the open border policy constituted by bilateral agreements between Syria and Lebanon.

Although UNHCR has not formally declared a prima facie status, nor established a temporary protection regime for Syrian refugees, it appears to apply ‘what could be considered a de facto prima facie refugee status determination’ (Janmyr, 2018:400), and regards Syrian presence as a ‘refugee movement’, considering that ‘these Syrians are seeking international protection and are likely to meet the refugee definition’ (LCRP, 2018). This includes persons displaced from Syria,⁴⁶ Syrian nationals registered – or seeking registration – as refugees by UNHCR, and Syrian de facto refugees (ibid).

As such, Syrians in Lebanon are unable to legalize their presence through the MoU, at least those arriving after 2011. In this light, UNHCR has attempted to renegotiate a new MoU, in 2013, to ‘[address] key protection gaps identified in the 2003 MoU, and include[s] issues such as non-refoulement, refugee status determination, registration, detention and the right of refugees to work as well as durable solutions’ (Janmyr, 2018:5). Despite lengthy negotiations, these discussions never materialized. Nowadays, the MoU is used for non-Syrian and non-Palestinian refugees.⁴⁷ The status of refugees and asylum seekers who are recognized by UNHCR, but fall outside the MoU – for example those who entered on legal grounds, prima facie refugees, or those under the complementary or temporary protection regime – is not legalized.

In fine, the current legal landscape in Lebanon does not offer a strong framework to uphold the rights the rights of refugees and asylum seekers, or to legalize their presence. Adding to this is the fact that, as of June 2012, Lebanese authorities have adopted a disassociation policy for Syrian refugees, using the term ‘(temporarily) displaced’ persons, rather than ‘refugees’. Although Palestinian refugees are referred to as ‘refugees’, those displaced in other contexts are not; scholars argue that the use of the term ‘refugee’ would encourage permanent settlement, and oblige Lebanese authorities to uphold any extra protection that is – arguably– believed to be inherent to this term. That is not to say that refugees and asylum seekers have not found refuge in Lebanon; yet, they may have done so under other formal categories of entry and residency.

However, a type of migration that is favoured under certain premises, is migration for economic purposes (Stevens, 2016).

The Lebanese labour market & economic migration

Decree no. 17561 (September 1964, see Appendix II) regulates foreign labour in Lebanon. Besides attributing roles (depending on different categories of workers) to either the Ministry of Labour, or General Directorate of General Security, it adopts three principles restricting foreigners’ right to work in Lebanon. The Lebanese government adopts the principle of preference of nationals, allowing foreigners to work in those professions that are not eligible for Lebanese (Longuenesse & Hachem, 2013; UNDP, n.d.a).⁴⁸ In this vein, the Ministry of Labour has the authority to enumerate a list of professions reserved only to Lebanese nationally, usually updated on an annual basis (for example: Decision no. 1/29 of 2018 Regarding the Professions exclusive to Lebanese Nationals). In reality, ‘liberal’ professions⁴⁹ are excluded for foreign labour, whereas manual and clerical jobs remain freely available.⁵⁰ Syrians generally are constrained to work in three sectors: construction, agriculture, and ‘environment’. ⁵¹

Second, it stipulates that foreigners in Lebanon are to obtain a work permit. In practice, this requires foreigners wishing to enter Lebanon to obtain pre-approval from the Ministry of Labour before entering the Lebanese territories, allowing for a temporary residency permit. A work permit can be obtained within ten days of arrival.⁵² After granting a work permit, the process of applying for a residency permit can start through GSO (IDAL, n.d.).

Third, it incorporates the principle of reciprocity, mutually allowing foreigners and locals from two respective states to enjoy the same rights and privileges in each others’ country.⁵³

However, it should be noted that the agricultural and domestic workers, who traditionally consist of large numbers of foreign workers, are excluded – and therefore do not enjoy protection – from the Lebanese Labour Law. The vast majority of foreign workers (80%) are migrant domestic workers (The General Directorate of General Security, 2016:16), mainly from Asian or African countries. For them, Lebanon – like many countries in the Middle East– operates versions of the kafala (‘sponsorship’) system, which ‘is comprised of various customary practices, administrative regulations, and legal requirements’ (Kafa (enough) Violence and Exploitation, 2012) and is implemented by the General Directorate for General 

Security. Sponsors, who can be Lebanese individual nationals⁵⁴ or employers, are held responsible for a workers’ legal acts through a notarised pledge that ties a migrant domestic workers’ residence permit to a sponsor. Importantly, the sponsor can withdraw his sponsorship at any time: migrant workers immediately lose their legal status upon termination of employment. This dependency leaves migrant domestic workers, employed on annual contracts, in an extremely vulnerable situation, as sponsors exercise considerable control over workers’ legal status, freedom of movement, and employment opportunities (Kafa (enough) Violence and Exploitation, 2012:11).

Although Lebanon has not ratified the 1949 Migration for Employment Convention, or the 1975 Migrant Workers Convention, constitutional principles bind Lebanon to apply the Universal Declaration of Human Rights⁵⁵, as well as other international treaties signed and ratified by Lebanon.⁵⁶ In reality, however, migrant workers are often unable to access the rights enshrined in these instruments. Critics of the kafala system state that ‘[u]npaid wages, the confiscation of passports, extensive working hours and heavy workload approximating slavery, limited communication possibilities with fellow workers or families at home as well as psychological, physical or sexual abuse are only some of the violations of rights MDWs have to face regularly’ (Benedek, et al., 2011:53). Worryingly, migrant workers are often unable to resign without a notarized release waiver signed by the employer and approved by the authorities. Although foreign workers, in general, have relatively easy access to legal status, it should be noted that without up to date sponsorship, migrant domestic workers in Lebanon are liable to penalties, imprisonment, and deportation under the 1962 Law regulating the entry and residency of foreign nationals (Jones, 2015). Despite heavy criticism from human rights advocates, the kafala system has been applied for Syrians since 2015, as well.

7. Many actors, limited mandates, and the predominance of the security apparatus

Migration flows in Lebanon, in reality, are governed by decree, by a set of formal and informal policies that are formulated on an ad hoc basis and differentiate between different nationalities. Moreover, migration governance is characterized by a disparity between law and practice, and involves a variety of formal and informal actors (for an overview of the main actors in migration governance, see Appendix III).

Indeed, Article 27 of the 1962 Law on Entry and Exit calls for the establishment of a committee consisting of Minister of the Interior and the Directors of the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs, and the General Directorate of General Security, adjudicated to grant asylum. In reality, this inter-ministerial committee – not to be confused with a comprehensive body for refugee status determination – appears to be cosmetic (Kyodo, 2003): the committee is ad hoc and not operational.⁵⁷ In this context, and in the absence of comprehensive refugee legislation, UNRWA and UNHCR, notably, have adopted important roles, and share some state responsibilities,⁵⁸ although the legal effect of UN involvement is confined.

UNRWA, the Lebanese authorities, and the Palestinian refugees: service provision with limited rights

The Department of Political and Refugee Affairs (DPRA) – nested within the Ministry of Interior is administered, amongst others, with the task to register Palestinian refugees, review requests for identity cards and laisser passer travel documents before transferring them to the General Directorate of General Security, and the registration or approval of civil matters (birth, marriage, divorce, death, change of residence, chance of sect) for Palestinian refugees.⁵⁹

Importantly, the Department is to work closely with UNRWA Lebanon to provide social services for Palestinian refugees. Established in 1948 following the Arab-Israeli conflict,⁶⁰ UNRWA, a subsidiary organ of the United Nations General Assembly without protection mandate, is unique in its ‘long-standing commitment to one group of refugees’. However, UNRWA’s mandate is not stated in one place⁶¹ but rather comprised of resolutions and requests passed by the General Assembly on a yearly basis (Bartholomeusz, 2010). It’s contemporary mandate focuses on providing human development and protection services to Palestinian refugees – including those from Syria – in UNRWA areas op operation, although budgetary constraints significantly render UNRWA’s work more difficult (Harris, G. & Gladstone, R., 2018; UNRWA, n.d.).

As such, Palestinians in Lebanon can be divided into three categories:⁶² those registered with UNRWA and the Lebanese authorities (estimately 460.000), those registered with the Lebanese authorities (between 10,000 - 40,000), and those who are registered at neither: ‘Non-ID Palestinian refugees’ (varying between 3,000 – 16,000) (Amnesty International, 2003 cited in Shafie, 2008).⁶³ Around 53% of the Palestinian refugees resides in one of the 12 Palestinian refugee camps, which are characterized by substandard housing standards, overcrowding, high rates of poverty,⁶⁴ poor levels of sanitation, and limited access to electricity and water, and are often considered ‘pockets of criminality’, with minimal access to them by state security apparatuses. In 2015, Palestinian’s unemployment rate amounted to 23.2% (Chaaban et al., 2015:2).

Although initially welcomed, notably during periods of rising Arab nationalist sentiments during the 1950s and 1960s (Sfeir, 2017), protracted Palestinian presence for over four generations, in addition to the participation to Palestinian faction to the Lebanese civil conflict, have led to a set of restrictive measures and policies. Although Palestinians’ access to basic rights is enshrined in international treaties signed by Lebanon, notably the 1965 Protocol for the Treatment of Palestinians in Arab States (‘Casablanca Protocol’; see Appendix I), Palestinian refugees are treated by Lebanese law as a ‘special category of foreigners’ (Refugee Studies Centre, 2010), not in the least because the principle of reciprocity, which allows foreigners to claim the same rights and privileges as local citizens in their respective states, a priori does not apply to Palestinians, in the absence of a formally recognized Palestinian state.

For example, although Palestinians are allowed to work in some clerical jobs, highly skilled ‘liberal’ professions remain restricted, which include law, medicine, engineering, pharmacy, etc (Decision no. 1/29, 2018 Regarding the occupations exclusive to Lebanese Nationals: see Appendix II). At the same time, several amendments in 2005 and 2010 have improved registered Palestinians’ access to work and social protection mechanisms, allowing for work permits to be extended up to three years,⁶⁵ lifting fees to obtain work permits, granting end of service compensation,⁶⁶ and access to the National Social Security Fund, although only partially.⁶⁷ However, it is noteworthy that conditions are formulated ambiguously, allowing for multiple interpretations of these provisions (Saghieh & Nammour, 2017).

Additionally, as non-Lebanese, Palestinians in Lebanon are prevented from owning or inheriting immovable property or real estate (law no. 296, April 2001: see Appendix II). Palestinian refugees have no access to Lebanese public medical services, and are therefore dependent on UNRWA and NGO services. Although Palestinians in general have access to 

public schools and universities, their access to public secondary schools is limited to 10% of total places, provided these places are not used by Lebanese (Refugee Studies Centre, 2010).

Based on the Casablanca Protocol, most Palestinians that are registered with UNRWA or the Lebanese Department of Palestinian Refugee Affairs, are eligible for for an identity card and a renewable special travel document. Although Palestinian refugees' right to residency and travel is subject to arbitrary implementation and changes the majority of registered Palestinians has legalized their presence (Refugee Studies Centre, 2010). As such, their freedom of movement is in general not restricted to (certain areas in) Lebanon (Sfeir, 2017).

As argued in this section, Palestinians, notably non-ID Palestinian refugees, face substantial challenges to enjoy human rights. Critics denounce this ‘manufactured vulnerability’ (Saghieh, 2015), which can be traced back to 70 years of Palestinian presence. As such, rather than preventing it, laws and policies facilitate de jure discrimination. Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) even face a more worrying situation due to their intersecting displacement profile.

UNHCR:  a larger mandate, with limited prerogatives

In 1963, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been established in Lebanon,⁶⁸ with the primary responsibility to support the Lebanese Government in providing protection and assistance to individual non-Palestinian asylum seekers and refugees, for whom a ‘non- camp’ policy applies. UNHCR - unlike UNRWA - does have a protection mandate, and has been delegated with refugee status determination, and finding durable solutions, notably.

However, as argued in the previous chapter, little legal significance is given to UNHCR’s refugee status determination, notably for those that do not fall within the 2003 MoU - which is the case for the majority of refugees. As such, refugees and asylum seekers are not guaranteed access to territories, nor protected against refoulement. UNHCR’s and UNRWA’s role is ‘strictly circumscribed by the Lebanese authorities’ (Janmyr and Mourad, 2018). For example, this is visible in the fact that UNHCR saw a significant increase in budget from 49 million USD in 2012 to almost 465 million in 2017 (UNHCR Key Figures, n.d.). As such, certain positions within ministries, for example the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Interior, are funded by UNHCR.⁶⁹ Similarly, UNHCR funds projects with the General Directorate for General Security, for example to facilitate registration processes with biometric scans (The Daily Star, 2014).

UNHCR’s growing influence does not result in policy changes (Janmyr, 2018), on the contrary, since May 2015, UNHCR has been requested to ‘temporarily’ suspend registration of Syrian refugees, and to deregister those who had returned to Syria – for example to receive medical aid that was unavailable or unaccessible in Lebanon (Lebanon Support, 2016c) or in order to vote (Stevens, 2016). In October 2014, at the peak of the refugee crisis and after years of apathy, alleged mounting strain on Lebanon’s economy and infrastructure moved the Council of Ministers – consisting of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Interior and Municipalities, the Minister of Social Affairs, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 

Immigrants⁷⁰ – to adopt the ‘October policies’. This series of policies, introduced under the heading ‘reducing the numbers’ was adopted in an attempt to halt the Syrian refugees’ influx at the Lebanese Syrian borders, to encourage Syrians who were already in Lebanon to return to Syria, and to formalize and control the presence of those who stayed (Lebanon Support, 2016a). The agency attributed with the task to implement these policies, was the General Directorate of General Security.

Formal and informal measures: the role of security actors in migration governance

The General Directorate of General Security is the authority attributed with the task to regulate foreigner’s entry and residency, which is done through administrative directives – that are often unpublished – and with minimal political or judicial oversight in the process, and in accordance with the 1962 law of Entry and Exit (Saghieh, N. & Frangieh, 2018).

Examples of the scope of the power of the General Security are the kafala system – that is implemented for migrant workers – and the ‘administrative detention’ of refugees. A representative of UNHCR illustrates:

The 1962 Law on Entry and Residency grants the GSO the right to deport people who might be a threat to public security and safety. […] Until deportation, GSO has the right to detain this person in ‘administrative detention’. However, administrative detention is not specified by law; so there is no duration or limit for.⁷¹

Arbitrary prolonged detention after the expiry of judicially imposed sentences, occurred extensively notably in the light of the Iraqi refugee crisis as a ‘policy of deterrence’ (Frontiers-Ruwad, 2008:6). Iraqi refugees were detained in large numbers⁷² and presented with the option to sign release forms justifying the ‘voluntary’ nature of their departure, or to stay imprisoned, awaiting trial.⁷³ As such, unlawful detention coerced refugees to return, and thus can be regarded de facto refoulement (Frontiers-Ruwad, 2008:7).

More recently, the General Directorate of General Security’s (GSO) role is visible through the analysis of a series of policies adopted by the Council of Ministers, and implemented for Syrian refugees by GSO. On the 31st of December 2014, new visa requirements based on a variety of ‘categories’ were introduced to regulate Syrian entry into Lebanon, although violating the open door policy constituted by bilateral agreements between Syria and Lebanon.

The introduction of these categories significantly prevented Syrians in Lebanon to maintain or obtain a legal status, marking a clear distinction between short-term visa’s for purposes of tourism, business, shopping, property owners or tenants, study, transits, medical treatment, and appointments with embassies (Lebanon Support, 2016a), and long-term residencies (accompanied by a visa indicating the purpose of stay).

For long-term presence, the introduction of the new policy clearly distinguished between ‘displaced’ individuals and migrant workers. Most importantly, although a newly introduced ‘humanitarian exception’ category suggested entry for displaced Syrians, a refugee category was still lacking. In reality, the ‘humanitarian exception’ category only applies to ‘unaccompanied and/or separated children with a parent already registered in Lebanon, persons living with disabilities with a relative already registered in Lebanon, persons with urgent medical needs for whom treatment in Syria is unavailable, and persons who will be resettled in third countries’ (Amnesty International, 2015:11). Additionally, human rights activists arguably contest the Ministry of Social Affairs’ presence at the borders, that is attributed with the task to screen Syrian entries for complying with the ‘humanitarian exceptions’ criteria. Although in the light of the Syrian crisis, no cases of refoulement are registered in Lebanon, lawyers and human rights activists emphasize that people rejected at border entry points wishing to (re)enter Lebanon are not included in these numbers.⁷⁴ A UNHCR representative illustrates:

Due to the current regulations, this could have happened many times. However the government would tell you that refugees are applying in the wrong category. For example, if I’m Syrian and I apply under the tourism category – because I have to – although I'm coming because I fear for my life and I am technically a refugee, this can be rejected. For the Lebanese government, I am then a tourist, because I applied for tourism. But at the same time, there is not a refugee category or humanitarian category at the border.⁷⁵

The ‘persons of concern’ already registered at UNHCR were unable to regularize their status at General Directorate of General Security, and, moreover, were requested to sign a ‘pledge to not work’, prohibiting their access to the Lebanese labour market. For Syrian workers, in order to implement the October policies, the kafala system, highly contested by human rights advocates, was extended. In addition, Syrian labour in Lebanon was restricted to the sectors construction, agriculture, and ‘environment’ – all of which traditionally host large numbers of foreign, notably Syrian, workers.

Yet, the influx of Syrian refugees should be viewed in a context characterised by continuous waves of Syrian migration towards Lebanon. Chalcraft (2009) distinguishes a clear pattern of migration and return, to the extent that Lebanon, long before the eruption of the Syrian crisis in 2011, has been hosting an estimate 300 000 to 600 000 Syrians, who were mainly involved in seasonal and menial work (SNAP, 2013; World Bank, 2013). This renders a clear categorization of ‘refugees’ as opposed to ‘migrants’ more difficult as of 2011. A representative of a human rights organisation explains: ‘We used to have Syrians who […] were here [in Lebanon] as economic migrants, who were registered as refugees at UNHCR and then were resettled to other countries. At the same time, there are Syrians who were actually coming from Syria, who were in very vulnerable positions but couldn't show or prove their vulnerability to UNHCR, and were not registered [or resettled] because of that’.⁷⁶

Lastly, residency renewal fees, although previously free of charge, were raised to a biannual fee of 200 USD – a significant amount for Syrian refugees, of whom 91% is currently estimated to be in debt and 71% of whom falls under the poverty line of 3.84 USD per day – and included administrative requirements (valid passport, entry slip) that many Syrians were not able to meet (LCRP, 2017; UNICEF, UNHCR & WFP, 2016). Still, even for those who met all criteria, and could meet all administrative and financial requirements, rules were applied in an arbitrary manner (Lebanon Support, 2016a).

In fine, the October policies meant a significant change for Syrian presence. Syrian refugees, over a million of whom are registered at UNHCR, generally were unable to enter Lebanon, or renew their residency at General Directorate of General Security. The consequences of illegality have been tremendous, severely restricting Syrians’ freedom of movement – notably of men, who are more prone to arrest and arbitrary detention when passing Lebanon’s many checkpoints. Yet, while sidestepping state institutions, refugees often find themselves unable to access work, school, social services, or healthcare services (Lebanon Support, 2016c). Being without legal status, prohibited or unable to enter the labour market while at the same time not receiving sufficient social services, led to large-scale deprivation of rights of Syrian refugees, children being born stateless, exposure to exploitation, and/or (sexual) abuse. Ironically, although measures initially were adopted in an attempt to regularize Syrian presence in Lebanon, conditions appear to have reinforced the existence of a black market (Lebanon Support 2016a; 2016b).

In this vein, and in a context where approximately 74% of Syrians is estimated to be without legal status (VaSyr 2017; p.13) and a mere 7% is approximately resettled⁷⁷, regularising legal status through labour migration has also been used as a coping strategy by Syrians, at times even required General Directorate of General Security (Lebanon Support, 2016a).⁷⁸ the ‘worker’ category is used as – often the only – possibility towards lawful presence in the country. Yet, after the introduction of the kafala system, also referred to as ‘modern slavery’, the ‘positive’ effect of such a choice, often coincided with exorbitant amounts of money to be paid to emerging ‘middleman’ figures, should be critically evaluated.

The policy has seen minor amendments after 2015. In July 2016, following the London Conference and negotiations at the national and international level, the pledge not to work has been replaced by ‘a pledge to abide by Lebanese laws’ (Brussels Conference, 2017a) – which requires a work permit granted by the Minister of Labour himself. Given that around 3% of Syrians has applied to obtain a work permit in previous years (IRC, 2015), and ‘few Lebanese companies want to take on this difficult, bureaucratic and expensive responsibility’, (Faek, 2017) Syrians only have work permits in highly exceptional cases (Lebanon Support 2016b:11).

In addition, in February and March 2017, General Directorate of General Security announced to waive the hefty 200 USD fee imposed on Syrians wishing to regularize their status (The General Security, n.d.). As of then, Syrians were granted a six month residency permit – renewable for multiple times – free of charge. Yet, it should be noted that requirements (i) included UNHCR registration prior to 1 January 2015, and (ii) excluded those who has previously renewed their residency on tourism, sponsorship, property owner, or 

tenant grounds, in 2015 or 2016, regardless of whether or not this context was still applicable to them (WGPASDCL, 2017:11). Especially in a context where UNHCR, since January 2015, was requested to suspend registration of refugees, large numbers of vulnerable refugees are unable to benefit from the fee waiver (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Moreover, General Security offices (37%) have been reported to apply the waiver in an unsystematic way, or not to apply it, at all (WGPASDCL, 2017). Those registered under the kafala system, are still subject to the same fees (Alef Legal Safety 2017:12). Lastly, in exceptional conditions, individuals were able to change their kafeel between September 2017 to March 2018 (Frangieh, 2017).

In April 2018, Syrian children without valid national passport or identity who turned ages 15 to 18 after entering Lebanon, can obtain a temporary residency card via the General Directorate of General Security by presenting their Syrian individual status record, provided that it is not older than two years (Human Rights Watch, 2018a). Not only may this be problematic for some, the policy also excludes those who already turned 19.

In sum, in reality, little has changed improving the legal status and living conditions of Syrian refugees, since the policies have been implemented as of January 2015. Furthermore, notably following counterterrorism clashes in Arsal between the Lebanese Army and Syrian Islamist militants in 2014, ‘security raids on refugee settlements and arrests of refugees without legal status have frequented’ and retaliatory measures have increased, to the extent that in June 2017, during a series of raids by the Lebanese Armed Forces, 5041 and 35042 refugees were arrested (WGPASDCL, 2017).⁷⁹

Adding to this is the fact that some local municipalities and vigilante groups have emerged as security actors, by implementing night-time curfews and street patrols – which follow an unpredictable pattern – for refugees, (Lebanon Support, 2016d). In addition, approximately 3,664 Syrian nationals have been reported to be evicted from around 13 municipalities between early 2016 to early 2018, and ‘almost 42,000 Syrian refugees remained at risk of eviction in 2017’ (Human Rights Watch, 2018b). Despite being ‘illegal and unjustified as they are not enforced by relevant security authorities for valid security reasons’ (The Araby Weekly, 2016). Still, no fair, effective, independent monitoring and accountability mechanisms have been established (WGPASDCL, 2017). On the contrary, literature indicates how Lebanese state security agencies not only tolerate the emergence of informal actors and/or measures, but sometimes even rely on them (Lebanon Support, 2016d), severely restricting refugees to access basic human rights, enshrined in the constitution.

Combined with a lack of legal redress measures have created a constant atmosphere of fear among Syrians, going to extremes in order to seek refuge.⁸⁰ As opposed to prolonged arbitrary detention, a lack of legal status and precarious living conditions now appear to be used to encourage refugees to return, circumventing the principle of non-refoulement (Frangieh, 2014).

Indeed, increasing numbers of Syrians are reported to have returned in convoys organised by General Security to Syria⁸¹ although perspectives on whether or not the necessary conditions for voluntary return to Syria have been met differ vastly within the international community (The Daily Star, 2018b; Foreign Affairs & International Relations, 2018).⁸² UNHCR, that has been focusing on the resettlement and return of Syrian refugees since the eruption of the crisis in 2011, denied to have had a leading role in these returns, emphasising its role in assessing refugees’ intentions, as well as conditions under which these returns took place (Refugees Lebanon, 2018).⁸³ In this vein, UNHCR investigates, amongst others, whether all family members have the wish to return, whether or not they possess property in Syria and whether this property is still intact after war violence, as it aims to prevent ‘secondary’ (internal) displacement in Syria. Moreover, UNHCR representatives emphasised that UNHCR has no access to areas where Syrians returned to, limiting UNHCR’s protection role.⁸⁴ This standard UNHCR policy⁸⁵ was condemned by Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, as it would discourage Syrian refugees from returning (The Daily Star, 2018c). As a result, Bassil ordered a freeze on the renewal of UNHCR staff residency permits in June, 2018 (The Daily Star, 2018d).

Contrastingly, although statistics are generally unavailable, it is noteworthy that Lebanon also hosts western, often highly-skilled ‘expatriates’ (UNDP, n.d.). Although their access to the labour market, too, is restricted to particular professions, and they require a work permit as well, anecdotal evidence suggests their lawful presence is Lebanon is constituted by tourism purposes, leading them to leave the country on a three monthly basis. Those who reside illegally in the country in most cases do not have to fear punitive measures,⁸⁶ and they generally are not subject to arbitrary arrests, or curfews: ‘When asked whether French people are required to respect the curfew, one municipal representative found the question a bit provocative and argued that they don’t bother with ‘“these types of foreigners”, because they do not cause any problems like the migrant workers do’ (El Helou, 2014).

The Lebanese judiciary: a voice unheard

Although the Lebanese judiciary, as well as the international community, have long condemned practices violating the constitution, international treaties – including bilateral agreements – and domestic legislation, refugees and migrants too often find themselves deprived from access to basic human rights.

Refugees, asylum seekers, and migrant workers, notably after the expiry of their judicial sentences, are held in administrative detention and/or without being referred to a judge (Frontiers-Ruwad, 2010). Moreover, many fear to come forward to go to trial. The director of a human rights organisation explains: ‘That is the problem: because you have people who are vulnerable, they would not present charges themselves.’⁸⁷ Yet, even in case they do present charges, they are reported to be tried in swift, mass hearings, oftentimes without being able to express their motives for seeking refuge (Frontiers-Ruwad, 2008).

Still, despite explicit condemnations by the judiciary, the General Directorate for General Security has ‘contested judges’ competence and jurisdiction, evaded the receipt of judicial orders, and refused to execute them once received. It has deported detainees in spite of rulings blocking their deportation and ordering their release’ (Frontiers-Ruwad, 2010:X).

Had judicial institutions, notably the Cassation Public Prosecution, had played a more active role, the forcible return of refugees and asylum seekers would have been prohibited more often (Saghieh and Frangieh, 2018). Although the Lebanese law includes ‘clear remedies for those who have experienced abuse at the hands of the state, creating actionable rights and clear civil and criminal penalties’, these are rarely put forward in court, and are virtually never effective in safeguarding the safety, dignity and liberty of refugees and asylum seekers (Frontiers-Ruwad, 2008:7).

At the same time, some positive developments can be witnessed. In February 2018, the State Council – Lebanon’s High Administrative Court – issued a decision clarifying that the competent authority to amend conditions for Syrian entry and residency is the Council of Ministers, whereas General Security’s role is confined to applying these conditions. In this vein, the restrictive measures, imposed fees, and other requirements introduced by General Security affecting Syrian’s legal entry and residency, were annulled. It also stated that ‘Any amendment to the conditions of Syrians’ entry and residence in Lebanon must respect the international agreements signed with Syria, which guarantee freedom of movement of people between the two countries and freedom of residence and work’ (Saghieh and Frangieh, 2018).

The State Council’s decision is welcomed as a positive step towards ensuring the rights of all citizens – whether local, foreign, refugee, migrant, or ‘expat’ – on Lebanese territories, as it clearly outlines the role of the Council of Ministers as the only suitable, and accountable organ to adjust policies, correcting the General Security when ‘overstepping’ its power (Saghieh and Frangieh, 2018). In reality, however, little progress has been made since January 2018: neither did General Security announce the annulment of the – legally invalid – 2015 implementations, nor did the Council of Ministers issue a new – more appropriate – decision regulating the conditions of Syrians’ entry and residence in Lebanon.

8. Conclusion

Lebanon has been historically characterized by continuous circulation of people: waves of immigrants leaving the country to flee national and international conflicts, natural disasters, and economic crises, as well as influxes of persons seeking refuge in the country. Lebanon was a land of refuge for Armenians in the nineteenth century, and in the twentieth to waves of Palestinian, Iraqi, and Sudanese refugees. More recently, more than a million Syrian refugees have put considerable strain on Lebanon’s already weak infrastructure, and political and social stability.

Despite its contributions to the establishment of international refugee law, Lebanon has not ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention or its 1967 Protocol. Moreover, a coherent domestic framework constituting the right to asylum has not been established. Indeed, although some provisions in immigration law stipulate the access to asylum, these date back to ‘60s, and although considered progressive and welcoming at the time, they have seen minor amendments and do not offer a strong legal framework to protect asylum seekers and refugees.

Governmental responses were characterized by a ‘laissez-faire’ approach and an absence of strategic decision-making, notably by an ad hoc and non-operational inter-ministerial committee adjudicated to grant asylum. Depending on nationality and displacement context, refugees are able – or not – to regularize their status.In addition, the variety of displacement profile of asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants, who – as is especially the case with Syrians – often have been residing in Lebanon long before being classified as ‘refugee’, adds to the difficulty to differentiate among refugee, asylum seeker, and migrant labels and classifications, and renders migration governance fragmented and cumbersome.

Whereas a directorate was established to regularize the status of refugees for Palestinian refugees by the Lebanese authorities, the main responsibilities of refugee status determination of non-Palestinians has been transmitted to UNHCR. In reality, however, little significance is given to UN refugee statuses by Lebanese authorities. The absence of a clear mandate for actors governing and regulating migration in Lebanon appears to add to a constant state of emergency; asylum seekers and refugees mainly seem to depend on the discretionary power of security apparatus the General Directorate of General Security. Moreover, in the absence of a coherent policy on migration, a policy of intimidation and arbitrariness, notably for those without legal status, appears to be in place.

Furthermore, protracted displacement is rendering aid more difficult. As the crisis endures, what was initiated as a short-term humanitarian and emergency intervention has transformed into a medium-term operation which has lead, seven years into the crisis, to a donor fatigue.

In a context of withering national and international assistance, precarious living conditions, scapegoating discourses by the media and political figures, increased securitization of refugee presence, and minimal resettlement to richer countries, refugees and asylum seekers appear to be presented with the option to endure significant hardships in Lebanon, or to return to their home country. Waves of ‘voluntary returns’ are on the rise, despite limited access to information on the ongoing conflict or inherent risks in Syria, undermining the mere principle of non-refoulement.

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